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This paper evaluates the effect of R&D tax incentives in a quasi-
experimental setting. I identify the impact by exploiting a reform in
UK policy which increased the SME threshold from 250 to 500 employ-
ees. First, I provide evidence that tax incentives help to increase R&D
spending at the company level, and the effect translates to a user cost
elasticity of -1.18. Second, R&D generated through the reform may be
attributable to an increase in the number of R&D employees. I use
R&D survey data for which the companies do not have an incentive to
relabel their ordinary spending as R&D.
JEL Classification: H25, O30
Keywords: R&D, tax credits, difference-in-differences
*Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (CBT). E-mail: irem.guceri@sbs.ox.ac.uk.
I am grateful for helpful comments from Steve Bond, Michael Devereux, Molly Saunders-
Scott and Helen Simpson, as well as seminar and conference participants at CBT, ZEW,
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Koc University, Bilkent University,
Ozyegin University and the National Tax Association Annual Congress in 2015. I thank
the Office for National Statistics and Secure Data Service (UK Data Archive) for providing
the data and for financial support from ESRC under grant ES/L000016/1 and from Argela
through the doctoral studentship agreement between Oxford University and Argela. Dis-
claimer: This work contains statistical data from the Office for National Statistics which
is Crown copyright and reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and
Queen’s Printer for Scotland, made available for use by the UK Data Archive. The Of-
fice for National Statistics, the UK Data Archive and Argela bear no responsibility for the
analysis of the statistical data or the opinions presented in this paper.
1
1 Introduction
Governments subsidize R&D in order to reach the socially optimal level
of private investment in innovation (Jones and Williams (1998)). From the
government’s perspective, one way of subsidizing private R&D is to directly
fund projects that it chooses from a pool of applicants. From the companies’
perspective, R&D is a risky activity and the companies themselves are better
informed than the government to decide on the potential success and economic
viability of their R&D opportunities. Criticisms over the government’s abil-
ity in choosing the best R&D projects have led to an increased emphasis on
tax incentives to support private R&D. The United States, France and Japan
have offered R&D tax incentives for decades now, but in the 2000s, the imple-
mentation of this policy became ever more prevalent, with France and Japan
substantially increasing the generosity of their R&D tax incentive schemes
while some other leading players in R&D and innovation such as South Korea,
China and the United Kingdom introducing schemes that later constituted a
large portion of government financing for business R&D in these countries.
In this paper, I explore the impact of tax incentives for R&D on various
firm-level outcomes. I evaluate the impact of an R&D tax relief on the real
R&D spending and R&D employment in a firm. I achieve this by applying a
difference-in-differences regression and a propensity score matching approach,
using the micro level Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD)
data for the UK collected by the Office for National Statistics. I exploit a
discontinuity in the design of the schemes in order to identify the policy impact.
Wider availability of micro level data has enabled quasi-experimental work
on R&D policies in the recent years. Bronzini and Iachini (2014) use data on
the population of applicants to an R&D subsidy in northern Italy to evaluate
a direct subsidy programme with a regression discontinuity design (RDD), and
find that the policy was effective in increasing R&D spending by small firms,
but not by large firms. Identification through RDD is possible in Bronzini and
Iachini (2014)’s work thanks to the discontinuity in scores that are given to
each project in the selection of beneficiaries.
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There is an emerging literature that explores the impact of tax incentives
on R&D by exploiting policy discontinuities. In Guceri and Liu (2015), we use
administrative tax returns data to exploit the breaks in the UK policy and es-
timate the effect of the R&D tax relief on R&D spending that qualifies for the
tax breaks. This is among the recent wave of studies that use administrative
data in a quasi-experimental setup (other examples are Agrawal et al. (2014),
Rao (2015), Lokshin and Mohnen (2012)). These studies generally find a pos-
itive and significant effect of tax incentives on R&D spending by businesses.
One main advantage of administrative data is the access to information on
the population of firms that benefit from the policy. A disadvantage, on the
other hand, is that companies may have an incentive to relabel ordinary spend-
ing as R&D to obtain the tax credit. Moreover, information in tax returns
data is usually more limited, for example, to expenditures that qualify for tax
incentives.
The finding that tax incentives for R&D may have a positive impact on
R&D spending attracted criticism from two main angles. First, Goolsbee
(1998) and Rogers (2010) warned that with the introduction of R&D support
policies, the majority of increased R&D expenditures may go to higher salaries
for scientists and engineers, rather than fund the employment of a larger num-
ber of researchers to scale up R&D activities. Goolsbee (1998) supported this
finding by demonstrating that there is a relatively stable supply of scientists,
with expenditure on pay rising significantly following increases in government
subsidies to support R&D expenditure by firms. Second, many studies flagged
the issue of relabelling ordinary expenses as R&D, even though the extent of
the problem has rarely been quantified. Some evidence of relabelling was pro-
vided in an early report by the US General Accounting Office (1989), which
found that around 20 percent of revenue agents were not convinced by the
clarity of the definition of qualifying expenses. A more recent US GAO study
(2009) identified the main expenditure items which are more difficult to moni-
tor for the tax authority. On the top of their list was the proportion of salaries
paid to management level staff who supervise research activities.
The micro level BERD survey that I use in this study is anonymous and
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the data cannot be matched with the tax records due to ONS’s legal promise
to the respondents. This legal requirement presents an opportunity for the
purpose of this study, as companies do not have an incentive to misreport
their ordinary spending as R&D when responding to the BERD survey. The
other advantage is that the BERD survey has a measure for R&D headcount
within the company, allowing for the study of changes in the firm’s R&D
employment.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) underline the difficulty and the importance
of finding exogenous variation in the user cost of capital to identify the effect
of tax incentive-type R&D support policies. The UK policy setting provides
a suitable basis for exploiting such exogenous variation, using difference-in-
difference and matching methods with individual fixed effects, as often applied
in public policy contexts (for examples, see Yagan (2015), Zwick and Mahon
(2014)). In the UK, R&D tax incentives were first introduced for SMEs (in
2000) and then for large companies (in 2002). In 2008, two reforms took place.
First the rates for enhanced deduction increased for SMEs from £150 to £175
for each £100 spent on R&D (150 to 175 percent), and for large firms the
rate increase was from 125 percent to 130 percent. For the large firms, the
increase did not lead to a substantive reduction in the cost of R&D capital
because there was also a reduction in the tax rate. For SMEs, the reform had
a more substantial effect. In August 2008, more importantly, the definition to
qualify as an SME changed from 250 employees to 500 employees (along with
other criteria, which I discuss in Section 2). This second reform that took
place in 2008 meant a large decline in the user cost of R&D capital for the
medium-sized companies whose definition changed from ‘large’ to ‘SME’ for
the purpose of the R&D tax relief. The drop in the user cost of R&D capital
was between 15-21 percent for this ‘treated’ group of firms depending on their
taxable profit.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, the doubling of the
thresholds for eligibility to the R&D tax relief for SME provides a valuable
opportunity to identify the effects of R&D tax incentives. The policy reform
generates a natural control group whose user cost of R&D capital remains
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unaffected by the reform, and a natural treatment group which experiences
a drastic reduction in user cost of R&D capital as a result of the change
in the eligibility criteria. Second, the Office for National Statistics reassures
firms that the data on individual companies cannot be identified or used for
other purposes than statistical analysis.1 This mitigates firms’ incentives to
lie about their R&D spending or to relabel ordinary spending as R&D. Third,
the BERD survey includes information on R&D employment which helps in
exploring whether the R&D spending that appears to have been generated by
the reform is a result of firms increasing the scale of their R&D activities.
I find that the treated firms increased their R&D spending by around 20
percent on average in response to the reform. Measuring against the 17 per-
cent average reduction in the user cost of R&D capital, the increase translates
to an implied user cost elasticity estimate of around -1.18, which is in the
same ballpark as the cross-country finding of Bloom et al. (2002) that used
an instrumental variables approach. Without considering the social returns
to R&D through spillover effects, I calculate that the return to each £1 fore-
gone in corporation tax is between £0.9 − £1.2 in R&D, suggesting that the
Government recovers its cost from implementing the policy.
In the next section, I present some aggregate trends in the R&D perfor-
mance of UK businesses, describe the R&D tax policy framework in the UK,
and then outline the conceptual framework. In Section 3, I describe the data,
and in Section 4, present the empirical approach. Section 5 presents the results,
Section 6 presents robustness checks and Section 7 discusses the mechanisms
that may be driving the results. The final section concludes.
1The ONS Code of Confidentiality can be found at
https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/monitoring-and-assessment/code-of-practice/
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2 Background
2.1 Trends in the UK private sector R&D intensity
Tax incentives for R&D aim to boost the private sector’s R&D performance.
An aggregate measure for a country’s private R&D performance is the intensity
of its Business Enterprise Expenditure on Research and Development (BERD),
that is, the share of BERD in total value added of the private sector. In
the past several decades, the UK private sector’s R&D performance has been
sluggish both in absolute terms and in terms of BERD intensity with respect
to comparators such as the United States, Germany, France and Japan.
[Figure 1 here]
The OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) and Analytical Business Enter-
prise Research and Development (ANBERD) Databases report cross country
time series data on R&D expenditure volumes and provide a sectoral break-
down. Using these figures, I obtain cross country comparisons of R&D intensi-
ties, as in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that total BERD as a share of value added
has been lower, and has been declining in the UK relative to Japan, Germany,
France and the USA over the period 1990-2008. Earlier studies (see, for in-
stance, Van Reenen (1997), Griffith and Harrison (2003)) have shown that
this relative decline of UK BERD intensity has been continuing for several
decades. At the aggregate level without controlling for any other factors, the
introduction of tax credits for R&D spending in the UK in 2000 and 2002
appears to have had little impact.
Despite the poor relative performance in overall BERD intensity, the UK
manufacturing sector BERD as a share of manufacturing sector value added,
has shown a steady increase and a tendency toward catching up with its peers.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that the UK manufacturing sector
BERD intensity has been rising over the most recent decade for which this
data is available and since the UK R&D tax credits were introduced. In
2000s, as the UK manufacturing sector BERD intensity experienced a rise, so
did its competitors’; France, Japan and the US all experienced steep rises, with
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only Germany demonstrating a rather horizontal trend. In an earlier paper,
we noted that these peer trends in neighboring countries may have been a
significant factor in driving the rise in the UK manufacturing sector R&D
intensity, but even controlling for these effects, the UK experienced a steeper
rise starting around the time of introduction of the R&D tax incentives (Bond
and Guceri (2012)).
[Figure 2 here]
In general, BERD performed by the services sector as a share of this sec-
tor’s value added is much lower than that of manufacturing. The share of
manufacturing sectors in total UK value added dropped from 26 percent in
1980 to 13 percent in 2007, while the share of service sectors has risen from
56 percent to 76 percent. The trends depicted in this section highlight drastic
changes in UK R&D intensity, but purely descriptive evidence is not sufficient
to derive causal relationships. The quasi-experimental approach of this paper
establishes a causal framework to evaluate the role and the effectiveness of
R&D tax incentives in the changing structure of the UK private sector’s R&D
activity.
2.2 The UK R&D tax incentive scheme
Fiscal incentives for R&D allow a special treatment of R&D expenditure
for tax purposes, and encompass a range of tax incentives for both current and
capital expenditures: tax credits, cash credits, enhanced deductions, special
depreciation allowance terms, enhanced loss carrybacks and carryforwards,
to list a few. The treatment of R&D expenditure is different for economic,
accounting and tax purposes. From an economic perspective, R&D is a type
of investment; its main objective is to generate higher revenues in the future.
From an accounting perspective, on the other hand, the majority of R&D is
treated as current expenditure and such expenditure is 100 percent deducted
against current revenue in the calculation of profits each period. If there are no
special tax incentives, the tax treatment is broadly in line with the accounting
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treatment and most of the spending on R&D is expensed in the computation
of taxable income. For the small part of R&D that is capitalized, firms can
only deduct from their accounting profits some estimate of the depreciation
charge on the stock of R&D capital in each period. Currently in the UK, as in
many other countries, both the current and the capital expenditures on R&D
are subject to a special tax treatment, and the details of this are explained in
the rest of this section.
Tax incentive schemes for R&D can be of two types: (i) incremental, where
firms benefit only to the extent that they exceed some base level of R&D that
they have previously been performing2 and (ii) volume-based, where firms
enjoy benefits on all their R&D expenditure, regardless of their past level. It
is becoming more and more common to introduce or increase the emphasis on
volume-based schemes among industrialized countries, as the design is simpler
and these benefits can be used by a larger group of beneficiaries.
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax is relatively generous in the
sense that both the SME and the large company schemes are volume-based.
The schemes are in the form of enhanced deductions of qualifying current ex-
penditures from taxable income, and lossmaking companies can carryforward
the benefit indefinitely. France had an incremental tax credit until 2008, and
then switched to a volume-based credit, greatly simplifying the design of the
preceding policy. The US provides an incremental tax credit with a 20-year
carryforward option, which is a longer time period than that allowed in most
countries. Canada provides a volume-based credit, and both Canada and the
US also provide sub-national tax credits (see, for instance, Wilson (2009) for
a discussion of sub-national tax credits).
Discussions on a more favorable tax treatment of R&D in the UK began in
the late 1990s. This was at least partly in response to the declining trend in the
R&D intensity of the UK economy overall, which was already at levels below
those of comparators such as France, Japan and Germany as demonstrated in
Figure 1. Before 2000, when the first significant tax breaks were introduced,
2Countries apply different rules regarding the base R&D expenditure that the firm needs
to exceed.
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all of current expenditure on R&D was 100 percent deductible against taxable
income and a subset of capital expenditures could be expensed under the
Research and Development Allowance3.
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax was introduced in two stages.
First, the SME scheme was implemented in April 2000 and then later in 2002,
the large company scheme was introduced. The SME scheme was a combi-
nation of an enhanced deduction and cash credits, with the former applying
to companies with positive taxable profits and the latter to those compa-
nies which incurred a tax loss in the reference period. The SME scheme
applied to companies which satisfied the SME definition of the EC Regulation
1996/280/EC and allowed these firms to deduct, for every £100 of qualifying
R&D expenditure, £150 from their taxable income4. These companies could
claim up to 24 percent of their R&D expenditure in cash if they did not have
taxable profit. The large company scheme was less generous: it allowed the
companies that were above the SME threshold to deduct, for every £100 ex-
penditure, £125 against taxable income and did not grant any cash credits.
When an SME conducts subcontracted R&D as a result of a contractual rela-
tionship with a large company, then the R&D undertaken by the SME is also
subjected to the deduction rates for large companies. In this study, I focus on
the ‘intramural R&D expenditure’ of companies, which is the component of
R&D spending that is subject to different rates for SMEs and large companies.
Based on a number of company interviews and case studies, a qualitative
HMRC review of the R&D tax credit states that the take up has been low in
the beginning of the scheme due to lack of awareness by the firms (Michaelis
et al. (2010)). Even for the companies that were aware of the tax credit, they
may have been inclined to delay their undertaking of R&D to the following
year given the apportionment of the tax credit in the first year of implemen-
tation. Based on these information, I selected calendar year 2003 as the first
implementation period for analysis, after the introduction of both the SME
3Formerly known as the ‘Scientific Research Allowance’. These capital allowances are
still available.
4SME definitions are explained in detail later.
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and large company tax relief schemes.
The enhanced deduction rates increased from 1 April 2008 onwards, and
this was followed by a change in the thresholds for defining an ‘SME’ for
tax credit purposes5. According to the EU regulations, the SME definition
consists of size thresholds and also requirements related to owner-subsidiary
relationships6. This implies that small firms which are subsidiaries of large
companies, which own stakes more than 25 percent in the firm, cannot benefit
from the SME incentive scheme. To qualify for the SME credit, companies
need to satisfy the employment criterion and then either the balance sheet
size or the turnover criteria.
During the period of interest for this study, eligibility for the SME tax
incentive first required that the company has fewer than 250 employees, and
either a balance sheet size of less than e43 million or turnover less than e50
million from 2005. In addition to having satisfied these criteria, the com-
pany should not have been owned by a group that exceeds these limits, or
the individual subsidiaries, when aggregated, should not have exceeded these
thresholds. Ownership in this context refers to more than 25 percent of the
capital or voting rights. After 1 August 2008, the employment, turnover and
asset size thresholds were doubled, allowing companies with fewer than 500
employees and either a balance sheet size of less than e86 million or turnover
less than e100 million to be able to benefit from the generous SME scheme.
The doubling of the SME tax relief eligibility thresholds allow for a natural
treatment group of medium sized companies that were, prior to 2008, benefit-
ing from the large company scheme and after 2008, from the more generous
SME scheme. The reduction in the user cost of R&D capital for the treated
medium sized companies was between 15-21 percent thanks to the reform.
5The size definition change took place on 1 August 2008, in line with the Corporation
Tax Act (CTA09/Ss1119 - 1121).
6The criteria for eligibility to the SME tax incentive scheme was determined based
on the relevant EC Regulation. Depending on the year, these were: 1996/280/EC and
2003/361/EC, with the latter taking effect for accounting periods ending later than 1 Jan-
uary 2005.
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2.3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical background on evaluating R&D tax credit schemes is in-
fluenced by the literature on tax incentives for physical investment, which is
based on the user cost of capital as a determinant of investment decisions,
first formalized by Jorgenson (1963) and then developed by Hall and Jorgen-
son (1967). Both their theoretical finding and the empirical analysis point to
a significant positive impact of tax credits and depreciation allowance schemes
on the firm’s capital intensity. Following Griliches (1979), ‘R&D capital stock’
or ‘knowledge stock’ can be considered analogously to the stock of physical
capital, and it is possible to establish the same relationship between tax in-
centives and R&D capital (as in Bloom et al. (2002) and Mairesse and Mulkay
(2011)). In this section, I focus on the static R&D spending decision of the
firm and abstract away from adjustment costs and the long term accumulation
of knowledge capital, so the model is solved as a static optimization problem,
which depends on the firm’s ‘knowledge production (Rt)’ in each period, using
labour input (R&D headcount, Lt) and other expenses on R&D (Mt). The
firm’s optimization problem is therefore:
max
Lt≥0,Mt≥0
Πt(Lt,Mt) subject to F (Lt,Mt) = AL
αL
t M
αM
t (1)
where the firm’s net revenue function takes into account the taxes paid on
corporate profits at rate τ and tax credits available for inputs into R&D at
credit rate c. The net revenue function in period t is:
Πt(Lt,Mt) =(1− τ)[ptF (Lt,Mt)− wtLt − rtMt] + c(wtLt + rtMt) (2)
Prices of R&D (pt), labour (wt) and other inputs (r
M
t ) are set exogenously
in competitive markets. Denoting the optimal labour, other inputs and R&D
output by L∗t , M
∗
t and R
∗
t respectively, the effects of an increase in the credit
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rate on total R&D spending and R&D headcount can be pinned down by:
∂L∗t
∂c
=
1
(1− αL − αM)(1− τ)
(1−αL−αM )(1− τ + c)
αL+αM
(1−αL−αM )κL (3)
∂M∗t
∂c
=
1
(1− αL − αM)(1− τ)
(1−αL−αM )(1− τ + c)
αL+αM
(1−αL−αM )κM (4)
∂R∗t
∂c
=
αL + αM
(1− αL − αM)(1− τ)
(1−αL−αM )(1− τ + c) −1(1−αL−αM )κR (5)
where κi are constants for i ∈ {K,L,R}, given input and output prices are set
in competitive markets. Assuming decreasing returns to scale in the ‘produc-
tion of knowledge’, the partial derivatives in Equations 3-5 are always positive.
Therefore, an increase in the tax credit rate would be expected to increase the
R&D spending by increasing the R&D headcount in a competitive labour
market for R&D employees and the amount of other inputs. The empirical
specifications in Section 4 can be thought of as estimating the log-linearized
version of the factor demand equations derived in this model, with the term
that captures taxes and tax credits represented by a dummy variable in a
difference-in-differences specification.
In this simple standard model, in response to an increase in the rate of
tax credits for R&D, we expect to observe an immediate increase in R&D
headcount, materials spending and knowledge production. The assumptions
of this framework, such as decreasing returns to scale in knowledge produc-
tion, and exogenous price setting in competitive input and output markets,
are also useful for illustrating the potential reasons why we may expect differ-
ent responses to increased generosity of tax incentives. For example, if R&D
employees have some bargaining power over their compensation, we may then
observe a setting where wt increases in response to an increase in c, and this
may affect Rt without increasing the R&D headcount. In Sections 5 and 7, I
explore the effects of an increase in the rate of R&D tax credits on total R&D
spending of a firm, as well as its R&D headcount. The empirical specifications
in this paper are influenced by a simple model as the one depicted in this
section; however, the quasi-experimental research design is not reliant on any
particular theoretical model.
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3 Data
3.1 Available data sources
The Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) survey is con-
ducted by the ONS, with the purpose of collecting the aggregate and sectoral
UK BERD statistics. The micro level BERD data has recently become avail-
able under secure conditions for approved research projects.
ONS follows the Frascati Manual (OECD (2002)) methodology to collect
the statistics on Business Enterprise Research and Development. The sam-
pling frame for this data uses the Annual Business Survey (ABS) as its major
source to identify R&D performing firms that employ more than 50 employees.
Other main data sources to identify firms which perform R&D include the UK
Innovation Survey, new R&D sector firms from the business register (Business
Structure Database; BSD), information from the Department for Business, In-
novation and Skills (BIS), International Trade in Services R&D Exporters data
and HMRC data on firms which claim R&D tax credits. ONS uses stratified
sampling to select the enterprises which will receive a BERD questionnaire
form each year. All questionnaire forms include at least questions on total
R&D spending (in-house and contract R&D) and R&D employment. The
micro BERD data set contains all the reporting unit-year observations that
were identified by the ONS as performing R&D in a given year. The observa-
tions that are left outside of the stratified sampling have imputed values for
the questions that are not answered, using the mean values of the variable
as a share of employment in the size band-sector cell. To avoid introducing
measurement error, I do not use these imputed values. Further information
is presented in Appendix A and in Guceri (2015).7 I merge the micro level
BERD data set with the other relevant ONS data sets; the ABS and the BSD
to obtain firm-level characteristics used as controls in this study.
The large company scheme was introduced in the 2002 fiscal year, with
2003 as the first full calendar year of implementation. In 2013, a new tax
7From Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 15/11, which provides the basis of
this paper.
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credit was introduced for large companies, along with the Patent Box regime,
rendering an estimation sample that is unaffected by other changes than the
2008 policy reform to cover the period 2003-2012.8.
Real expenditures on R&D is obtained by deflating the nominal intramu-
ral R&D expenditure from the BERD dataset using a weighted deflator with
50 percent weight on researcher salaries and 50 percent weight on the GDP
deflator. Intramural R&D here means the in-house R&D carried out by the
company by its own employees. The researcher salaries component of the
weighted deflator is taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) tables on gross annual pay for science and technology professionals
(Table code 2.7a, job code 21). The GDP deflator is obtained from the OECD
Economic Outlook ‘pgdp’ series (base year 2008). In the R&D literature, this
kind of weighted deflator is commonly used to reflect the fact that around 50
percent of R&D investment goes to the salaries and wages of research staff
(see, for instance, Bloom et al. (2002)). Data on employment is obtained from
the BSD.
3.2 Characteristics of treated and control groups
I select treatment and control groups based on the threshold for eligibility
to the SME Tax Relief. The BSD contains information on ownership, employ-
ment and turnover at the company group level for all UK companies, and no
information on asset size.9 The binding threshold to determine eligibility to
the SME scheme is the employment threshold, subject to limitations on owner-
ship by larger groups.10 I use the group-level employment to identify eligibility
and ‘intent to treat’ with the help of the information in the business register
(BSD). Before merging the employment information to the reporting unit-level
8The datasets used in this study were made available by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) and the Secure Data Service (SDS).
9Turnover information is sourced by the VAT records and this is only available for firms
that are above the VAT registration thresholds.
10For example, an enterprise may itself have 200 employees, and satisfy one of the turnover
or the asset size thresholds. Then the group level check involves aggregating the employment
numbers of each member in the whole group and then assessing whether the group as a whole
remains below the thresholds.
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R&D data, I aggregate employment over enterprise groups in the BSD to check
whether each reporting unit satisfies the group-level employment thresholds.
The treatment group is composed of companies that: (i) belong to enter-
prise groups with more than 250 employees in the pre-2008 period and hence
are considered ‘large’ for the purpose of the R&D tax relief, and (ii) belong
to enterprise groups with fewer than 500 employees in the post-2008 period
and hence are considered ‘SME’ for the purpose of the R&D tax relief. The
control group is composed of companies that: (i) belong to enterprise groups
with more than 250 employees in the pre-2008 period, and (ii) belong to en-
terprise groups with more than 500 employees in the post-2008 period, and
hence are considered as ‘large’ both before and after the reform. I require that
the companies appear in the BERD dataset with non-imputed R&D at least
once before and once after the reform, and therefore this study explores the
effects at the intensive margin. It is possible to restrict the size of the report-
ing units in the control group to make the size distribution more comparable
to the treated group. I present descriptive statistics and results based on a
control group sample which removes all observations on a reporting unit if, in
the pre-reform period, it belonged to the top percentile in the size (employ-
ment) distribution, along with a sample based on a propensity score matching
procedure.
The reporting period for BERD is the calendar year.11 The definition
change for determining an SME was introduced in August 2008, which is eight
months into calendar year 2008. I therefore ignore each firm’s status in 2008
for the purposes of both the allocation into treated and control groups and
also in the estimation stage when evaluating the response to the policy.
The full sample then contains a panel of non-imputed observations of
BERD variables on medium-sized and large companies. The sample contains
117 unique treated firms and 799 control firms.
More than 80 percent of total R&D activity in the UK is carried out by
11If the reporting unit does not have the record covering the calendar year, for instance
year t, then the record for a business year that ends between April 6th of period t and April
5th of period t + 1 is reported for the expenditure in year t.
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firms that have more than 250 employees. The empirical strategy of this paper
relies on the performance of medium sized enterprises relative to larger enter-
prises that are otherwise similar according to their observable characteristics.
Within the universe of non-imputed observations, in a representative year12,
around 42 percent of observations had more than 250 employees, representing
more than 80 percent of total R&D.
[Figure 3 here]
[Figure 4 here]
The sectoral compositions of medium-sized and large firms between pre-
and post-treatment periods are roughly similar, as can be observed in Figure
3 and Figure 4. In the figures, the blue line represents reporting units that
belong to medium sized firms and the red line represents reporting units that
belong to larger firms with 500-1000 employees. In Figure 3, I present the pre-
treatment period shares of observations in each of the sectors for medium-sized
and then large firms.13 Figure 4 traces the changes in the sectoral compositions
between pre- and post-treatment periods across the two groups, and apart from
the ‘Food’ sector, the changes between pre- and post-treatment periods in the
number of observations seem to have the same sign between the medium sized
and large groups.
In Figure 5, I present the trends in real R&D spending by the average
reporting unit in the treated and control groups. By nature, large companies
are bigger and spend more on R&D than medium sized firms. I present the
mean R&D spending series for large companies in ten thousands, and the mean
R&D spending for treated firms in thousands (both in real GBP with 2008
as the base year). The two groups follow roughly similar trends, with both
groups experiencing higher levels of spending in the 2009-2012 period.
12Year 2007
13The medium-sized and large firm groups that are presented in these figures are broader
than the treated and control group samples used in the regressions. In the final regression
samples, the number of observations in a few sectors fall below the ONS disclosure thresholds
and therefore I present these statistics in the larger samples, which provide a similar picture
as the treated and control groups in the final regressions.
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[Figure 5 here]
The number of R&D employees is another variable of interest, and the
R&D headcount data is available for all observations in BERD data for which
there is non-imputed information. Since BSD data provides total employment
information for all enterprises, it is possible to trace the evolution of the share
of R&D employees in total workforce of enterprises (Figure 6). This metric
is scaled by total firm size, and therefore we do not observe a substantial
difference between the levels of the share of R&D workers in total employment
across treated and control groups. Possibly because of the smaller number of
treated observations relative to control observations, the mean of the share of
R&D employees in total fluctuates more for the treated group than for the
control group.
[Figure 6 here]
4 Empirical approach
As the difference-in-difference specification, I estimate the following base
model:
rit = γ + δIDiTt + δTTt + x
′
itβx + ηi + νit (6)
where rit is the natural logarithm of R&D spending of reporting unit i in
year t in 2008 prices, Di is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for treated
observations, 0 for the control group, Tt is a dummy that takes on a value of 1
for post-2008 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient δI on the interaction term DiTt
thus captures any differential change in rit between the pre- and post-2008
periods for the treatment group compared to the control group, and the null
hypothesis of no impact of the introduction of more generous tax incentives
for larger firms corresponds to δI = 0. ηi are reporting unit fixed effects. I
later drop Tt and include a full set of year dummies. xit is a K × 1 vector
of controls, which, in different sets of results, include sector dummies, year
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dummies, lagged employment, employment growth rates and a quadratic term
for lagged level of employment.
Identification with the difference-in-differences estimator requires that the
common trends assumption be satisfied, that is, in the absence of treatment,
we should expect the change in the outcome variable between pre- and post-
intervention periods for the control group to be similar to the change in the
outcome variable for the treatment group. In Section 5, I present results
from regressions with placebo reforms in earlier years than the policy change
to verify that there are no significant differential trends between treated and
control groups in other years than the treatment year.
The control group has a larger number of observations than the treated
group. We may wish to improve on the similarities between the treated and
control groups, while exploiting the panel structure of the data. In Section 6,
following Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al.
(1998), I consider a difference-in-difference matching estimator. Difference-in-
difference (diff-in-diff) matching pairs treated observations with control ob-
servations based on observable characteristics x. Differently from the cross-
section propensity score matching, the diff-in-diff matching estimator evalu-
ates the average treatment effect on the treated based on the changes in the
outcome variable between the pre- and the post-treatment periods.
The observed characteristics X on which to match treated and control
firms should not be influenced by treatment, therefore, I estimate the propen-
sity scores based on pre-reform average characteristics. Each of the treated
firms is matched with a control firm (which are drawn with replacement), us-
ing propensity scores estimated based on the firms’ pre-reform average values
for employment growth rate (natural logarithm), age (natural logarithm), the
foreign ownership indicator and an indicator variable for high tech firms based
on the OECD sector classifications. Firm size measures such as employment
and real turnover have a strong effect on determining assignment to treatment,
however, these variables cannot be used in the matching process as they result
in matched pairs that are far from satisfying the overlap assumption. Propen-
sity scores are estimated using a logit. Table 1 presents the results of this ‘first
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stage’ logistic regression of the binary dummy variable ‘treatment’ on firms’
pre-reform average characteristics.
[Table 1 here]
Based on these variables, the matched treatment group retains the original
117 firms, and because the control observations are selected with replacement
based on their distance in their estimated propensity score from treated ob-
servations, a small subset of control observations get matched with more than
one treated observation. 98 unique control firms are matched with a treated
observation in the final sample.
In order to check the specification of the propensity score model, Table 2
presents comparisons between the means of treated and control groups. The
first column lists the variables used for matching in the preferred specification.
The third and the fourth columns present the means of the variables, followed
by the t-statistics for the test of equal means between treated and control,
and then the fourth column presents the p-value for the test. For the matched
sample, on average, there does not seem to be significant differences between
the treated and control observations. Figure 7 presents the distribution of
estimated propensity scores for the treated and control groups. Violations of
the overlap assumption can be detected if the treated and control groups have
large masses in the distributions at opposite ends of the scale, which is not the
case in Figure 7.
[Table 2 here]
[Figure 7 here]
5 Results
Using two methods, diff-in-diff regression and matching diff-in-diff, I find
broadly similar results that point at an increase in R&D spending at the firm
level by treated companies. Table 3 presents the diff-in-diff regression results
from the largest possible sample in Columns (1)-(5), then in Column (6)-(10), I
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refine the control group by removing all observations on reporting units which
fall in the largest category in terms of their pre-treatment period average em-
ployment levels. Columns (1) and (6) present estimates from the model in
Equation 6 without any controls. The positive effect of the policy is cap-
tured by the coefficient labeled ‘Interaction’ (diff-in-diff), but it is statistically
insignificant at conventional levels without controlling for the firm size. In
Columns (2) and (7), the ‘Post 2008’ dummy is replaced by year fixed effects
and two digit sector dummies are also included in the model. In Columns (3)
and (8), I include controls for the size of the firm, and the diff-in-diff coefficient
becomes significant at the 10 percent level. Firm size and growth rate variables
are all lagged by one period to avoid potential issues due to the simultaneous
determination of total employment and R&D spending. In Columns (4) and
(9), I include a control for the lagged growth rate of the firm, which turns out
to be a significant control variable, and drives the magnitude of the diff-in-diff
coefficient upward by 2 percentage points. Finally, in Columns (5) and (10), I
add the full set of control variables including a quadratic term for the firm size
measure. In the preferred specification (estimated in Columns (5) and (10)),
the diff-in-diff estimates indicate a positive and significant effect of the policy
on treated firms, with a magnitude of around 20 percent.
[Table 3 here]
6 Robustness
6.1 Placebo tests
Identification using the diff-in-diff method requires that in the absence of
the policy intervention, the treated and control group outcomes follow similar
trends. I test this assumption using placebo interventions in the pre-treatment
periods. These are presented in Table 4. In each of these years, using the
preferred specification, no significant differential change in any of the pre-
reform periods has been found, supporting that the common trends assumption
has not been violated in the pre-treatment years.
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[Table 4 here]
6.2 Matching
Understandably, the inclusion of size controls is important for detecting
the differential effect of the policy on the treated group of firms. As the next
step, I implement matching diff-in-diff to obtain more comparable treatment
and control groups. The matching process is as described in detail in Section
4. In Table 5, Column (1) presents results from propensity score matching on
pre-treatment average values of age (natural log), enterprise level employment
growth rate (natural log) and the foreign ownership indicator. In Column
(2), the set of variables used in the matching process additionally includes an
indicator for a ‘high technology firm’ following the OECD technology classifi-
cation of sectors. The standard errors that I present in Table 5 are calculated
following Abadie and Imbens (2006). The two matching procedures find an
effect of the policy of 27 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Despite the 14
percentage point difference between the two point estimates, it is difficult to
argue that these two coefficients are statistically different from each other, as
they are estimated with large standard errors.
[Table 5 here]
6.3 Did the reform come as a surprise?
One question in a policy setting where the announcement of the policy
predates implementation is whether beneficiaries adjust their investment be-
haviour after the announcement but prior to implementation of the policy. In
the case of the R&D Tax Relief schemes in the UK, the Chancellor announced
the Government’s intention to introduce the policy reform in the prior year’s
Budget before the reform took place, but enactment required EU State Aid
clearance and implementation was at best uncertain from the perspective of
potential beneficiaries. In this section, I present results from regressions which
remove the years after the Chancellor’s announcement prior to the reform, and
the first period after reform.
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The simplest way of assessing whether there has been any strategic delay-
ing is to omit all the periods between announcement and the first period of
implementation. Omission of the years 2007 and 2008 achieves this objective
(Table 6). In Table 7, I further remove 2009. In both Tables 6 and 7, regres-
sions in Columns (1)-(5) use all the observations and Columns (6)-(10) exclude
the firms that fall in the top percentile of the size distribution according to
their pre-treatment average employment. The estimated impact of the intro-
duction of the more generous tax relief for larger firms remains very similar to
that obtained using the full sample, suggesting an increase in R&D by around
18-19 percent. The smaller sample size results in a marginal reduction in the
statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on the diff-in-diff interaction
term, but there is no indication that our full sample results are seriously bi-
ased by firms postponing R&D expenditure until after the introduction of the
change in the eligibility criteria in August 2008. In these robustness checks,
the point estimate remains very close to the original estimates presented in
Table 3.
[Table 6 here]
[Table 7 here]
7 Mechanisms and discussion
Next, I explore the mechanisms that drive the increase in R&D spend-
ing. First, I examine the effect of the policy on the R&D employment of the
treated companies. Goolsbee (1998) argues that, due to the inelastic supply of
scientists and researchers, R&D subsidies only boost the salaries of researchers
instead of driving firms to take on new R&D projects and therefore increase
their R&D efforts. If companies responded to the tax relief by increasing their
R&D headcount, this would provide evidence to counter Goolsbee’s critique.
Because R&D employment is a count variable, I use a Poisson regression ap-
proach with reporting unit fixed effects to evaluate the impact of the reform
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on the R&D headcount. Table 8 presents the results from the Poisson regres-
sions with R&D employment as the dependent variable. As before, Columns
(1)-(5) present the diff-in-diff regression results from the largest possible sam-
ple, then in Columns (6)-(10), the control group is refined by removing all
observations on reporting units which fall in the largest category in terms of
their pre-treatment period average employment levels. The results presented
in this table does not offer sufficiently strong evidence for or against Goolsbee
(1998)’s critique. There is some indication of a positive effect of the policy
on the R&D headcount, but none of the diff-in-diff results in Table 8 is sta-
tistically significant.14 Regarding the effect on salaries, the short form BERD
questionnaire does not ask any question on salaries, and restricting the sample
to long form recipients reduces the sample size substantially.15
[Table 8 here]
Finally, I test the impact of the policy change on firms’ spending on ‘ex-
tramural R&D’, which includes R&D that is subcontracted to external parties
by the firm. There is a small number of firms that report positive extramural
R&D in the survey, and perhaps unsurprisingly, I do not find any significant
effect of the reform on this variable.
The UK R&D tax incentive scheme has gradually become more generous,
now with more than £1 billion cost to the Exchequer in foregone corporation
tax revenue annually. The findings of this paper suggest that the reform in
the R&D tax relief that changed the status of the enterprises in the treatment
group from ‘large’ to ‘SME’ caused these firms to increase their R&D spending
by more than 20 percent. Based on matching diff-in-diff, the point estimates
may go up to about 41 percent, although it is important to acknowledge that
there is a large overlap between the confidence intervals of these estimates. In
14The results in the estimation of models without reporting unit fixed effects with standard
errors clustered at the reporting unit level result in highly significant positive estimates of
the effect of the policy on R&D headcount.
15I separately estimate the effect of the policy change on R&D employment using matching
diff-in-diff. The point estimates are positive but have large standard errors and therefore
it is not possible to detect any effect of the policy on the R&D headcount of treated firms
using this methodology.
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Guceri and Liu (2015), we estimated that the drop in the user cost of R&D
capital for the treated group of firms thanks to the 2008 reform of the SME
tax relief eligibility criteria was around 17 percent.16
From the diff-in-diff point estimate of 20 percent, one can back out the
elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost, based on the finding that the
introduction of the change in the SME scheme eligibility criteria resulted in
a reduction in the user cost of R&D by about 17 percent in the UK. The
20 percent increase in spending therefore corresponds to a user cost elasticity
estimate of about -1.18. Using the BERD dataset, it is not clear whether the
increase in R&D spending is attributable to an increase in R&D headcount,
or higher salaries for R&D personnel.
Based on the estimated additionality effect of the policy of 20 percent
and the corresponding cost of the R&D tax relief to HMRC, it is possible
to calculate an estimate for the return for every pound of HMRC’s foregone
corporation tax revenue. The reform increased the burden of each unit of a
medium sized firm’s R&D on the Exchequer from 0.30×τ to 0.75×τ , where τ
is the statutory tax rate that applied to each firm.17 In addition to this extra
cost per unit of R&D, treated firms increase their R&D spending by about 20
percent in response to the policy reform, and hence the cost to the Exchequer
increases indirectly as well. For a firm that pays taxes at the main rate of 28
percent in the 2008-2010 period, every £1 R&D generated by the policy reform
of 20 percent results in HMRC to forego £0.23 of tax revenue. Similarly, for
a firm that pays taxes at the small profits rate of 21 percent, after the reform,
HMRC loses £0.17 of tax revenue due to the reclassification of treated firms
as SME and not large for the purpose of the R&D tax relief. These two
estimates result in an estimated bang-for-the-buck ranging between £0.9 and
£1.2. Based on the simple calculation without considering any spillovers that
16In Guceri and Liu (2015), we are able to observe the precise tax positions of each
company and therefore can estimate the reduction in the user cost of R&D capital.
17The calculation assumes away the firm specific discounting of losses carried forward and
the value of cash claims. The calculation can be thought of as one where all the firms pay
taxes, at least at the small profits rate. I also assume that R&D that qualifies for the R&D
tax relief increased by the same amount as estimated in this paper.
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may be generated by the policy, the results suggest that the Exchequer recovers
its cost.
Do the firms relabel their non-R&D employees as researchers in this con-
text? In the BERD survey, firms should not have an incentive to lie about
their R&D spending, as they are informed that their responses in the BERD
survey cannot be matched with their tax returns. To the extent that firms
keep their R&D records for the purpose of responding to ONS’s BERD Survey
separate from their records of qualifying R&D for the purpose of reporting to
the HMRC to claim R&D tax relief, we should not expect to observe relabeling
of ordinary spending as R&D in the BERD data.
8 Conclusion
The number of countries which offer R&D tax incentives to stimulate busi-
ness R&D spending has been increasing rapidly in the past few decades. After
a long period of relative decline in aggregate R&D intensity, the UK joined
the group of countries which offer generous fiscal incentives for R&D in 2000.
The first reform in 2000 was the introduction of the SME Tax Relief Scheme,
followed by the introduction of the large company scheme in 2002, which was
less generous than the SME scheme. In 2008, the definition of an ‘SME’ for the
purpose of the R&D Tax Relief expanded to include a group of medium sized
companies with up to 500 employees. In this study, I exploited the reduction
in the user cost of R&D for medium sized companies in comparison to their
slightly larger counterparts to obtain difference-in-differences and matching
(with diff-in-diff) estimates of the impact of R&D tax incentives.
Tax credits have a direct effect on the firms’ cost of investing in R&D.
Motivated by a simple neoclassical theoretical framework, the empirical spec-
ifications in this paper examined the effects of the change in the eligibility
thresholds to the SME tax relief scheme on R&D spending and on R&D per
worker at the enterprise level.
Controlling for firm size and growth using firm-level employment informa-
tion from the business register, I have found that treatment group companies
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which started to benefit from the SME scheme after the 2008-09 fiscal year
increased their R&D spending by around 20 percent in comparison to the
control group after the introduction of the policy. The robust estimate of
the 20 percent increase over the counterfactual scenario of less generous tax
credits for treated firms translates to an elasticity of R&D with respect to its
user cost of around -1.18. The corresponding bang-for-the-buck estimates of
£0.9-£1.2 suggest that the tax authority roughly recovers its additional cost
of implementing the new policy.
The BERD survey does not give any incentives to its respondents to relabel
ordinary spending as R&D. I therefore argue that, differently from the studies
that use administrative data, there is no reason for the magnitude of the effect
found in this study be affected by concerns related to relabeling.
I find some evidence of an increase in R&D headcount in response to the
policy, but the effect is weaker than for overall spending in R&D. Therefore, if
the policymakers are interested in scaling up a certain type of spending within
business R&D, in the policy design, they may consider differentiating between
R&D spending items such as headcount, salaries or materials.
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Figure 1: Total BERD intensity, UK and comparators
Source: OECD
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Figure 2: Manufacturing sector BERD intensity, UK and comparators
Source: OECD
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Figure 3: Sectoral distribution of medium-sized and large companies in the
pre-treatment period, non-imputed observations
Figure 4: Change in the sectoral distribution of medium-sized and large com-
panies in the post-treatment period, non-imputed observations
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Figure 5: Average real R&D spending, treated and control groups
Figure 6: Share of R&D employees in group level employment, treated and
control groups
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Figure 7: Density of estimated propensity scores, treated and control groups
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Table 1: Determinants of assignment to treatment
Outcome: Treatment (1) (2)
ln(employment growth rate) -2.469*** -2.514***
(pre-reform) (0.631) (0.634)
ln(age) -0.724** -0.760**
(pre-reform) (0.330) (0.328)
OECD high tech dummy 0.222
(0.215)
Foreign ownership† suppressed suppressed
(pre-reform) (insig.) (insig.)
No of obs 914 914
Treated no of firms 117 117
Control no of firms 799 799
†According to Secure Lab requirements, at least one coefficient
in each table needs to be suppressed
Table 2: Balancing tests
Variable (pre-reform avg.) Sample Treated Control t-stat p-val. Cell count
ln(emp.growth) Matched -0.03964 -0.04834 0.38 0.707 98
ln(age) Matched 3.3754 3.3936 -0.49 0.625 98
OECD high tech ind. Matched 0.65812 0.64103 0.27 0.785 98
Foreign ownership Matched 0.52137 0.45299 1.04 0.297 98
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference regression results
Outcome: ln(Real R&D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post2008 0.006 0.013
(0.030) (0.031)
Interaction 0.105 0.104 0.165* 0.180* 0.209** 0.099 0.099 0.162 0.177* 0.203*
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.105) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.100) (0.105)
Group level employment 0.121*** 0.148*** 0.411 0.122*** 0.148*** 0.405
(in logs, lagged) (0.025) (0.027) (0.264) (0.025) (0.027) (0.281)
Growth of group empl. -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(in logs, lagged) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Group level employment -0.018 -0.017
(in logs, lagged, squared) (0.017) (0.018)
Rep.unit fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Year effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.001 0.019 0.03 0.033 0.034 0.001 0.017 0.029 0.032 0.033
No of observations 5434 5434 5434 5434 5434 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005
Treated no of unique firms 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Control no of unique firms 799 799 799 799 799 738 738 738 738 738
Standard errors are clustered at the reporting unit level.
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Table 4: Results from placebo interventions in the pre-treatment period
Outcome: ln(Real R&D) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction2004 0.079
(0.109)
Interaction2005 0.106
(0.109)
Interaction2006 0.129
(0.104)
Interaction2007 0.137
(0.100)
Group level employment 0.351 0.361 0.369 0.376
(in logs, lagged) (0.259) (0.263) (0.266) (0.269)
Growth of group empl. -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.065***
(in logs, lagged) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Group level employment -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016
(in logs, lagged, squared) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Reporting unit fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sector effects Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032
No of observations 5005 5005 5005 5005
Treated no of unique firms 117 117 117 117
Control no of unique firms 738 738 738 738
Standard errors are clustered at the reporting unit level.
Table 5: Matching difference-in-difference results
(1) (2)
Outcome ln(Real R&D) ln(Real R&D)
Match var.s foreign own.ind., foreign own.ind., OECD high tech ind.,
ln(age), ln(emp. growth) ln(age), ln(emp. growth)
ATET 0.269* 0.406***
Std. errors (0.148) (0.146)
Treated no of unique RU 117 117
Matched no of control RU 98 98
Total no of control RU 799 799
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Table 6: Robustness: Response to Early Announcement of the Policy – dropping 2007 and 2008
Outcome: ln(Real R&D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post2008 0.024 0.037
(0.033) (0.034)
Interaction 0.073 0.083 0.145 0.157 0.188* 0.061 0.072 0.137 0.149 0.178
(0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.113) (0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.113)
Group level employment 0.128*** 0.149*** 0.454* 0.128*** 0.148*** 0.457*
(in logs, lagged) (0.025) (0.029) (0.247) (0.025) (0.029) (0.265)
Growth of group empl. -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.054** -0.052**
(in logs, lagged) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Group level employment -0.021 -0.021
(in logs, lagged, squared) (0.016) (0.017)
Rep.unit fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Year effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.001 0.02 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.001 0.019 0.033 0.035 0.037
No of observations 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4136 4136 4136 4136 4136
Treated no of unique firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Control no of unique firms 718 718 718 718 718 662 662 662 662 662
Standard errors are clustered at the reporting unit level.
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Table 7: Robustness: Response to Early Announcement of the Policy – dropping 2007, 2008 and 2009
Outcome: ln(Real R&D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post2008 0.055 0.069*
(0.037) (0.038)
Interaction 0.029 0.036 0.105 0.120 0.180 0.016 0.024 0.097 0.111 0.170
(0.124) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.124) (0.125) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128)
Group level employment 0.147*** 0.174*** 0.715*** 0.148*** 0.174*** 0.747***
(in logs, lagged) (0.027) (0.031) (0.142) (0.027) (0.031) (0.148)
Growth of group empl. -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.070***
(in logs, lagged) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Group level employment -0.036*** -0.039***
(in logs, lagged, squared) (0.009) (0.010)
Rep.unit fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Year effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.002 0.024 0.04 0.043 0.048 0.003 0.024 0.042 0.045 0.051
No of observations 3695 3695 3695 3695 3695 3409 3409 3409 3409 3409
Treated no of unique firms 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Control no of unique firms 650 650 650 650 650 601 601 601 601 601
Standard errors are clustered at the reporting unit level.
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Table 8: Difference-in-difference Poisson regression results – effect on R&D employment
Outcome: R&D employment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post2008 -0.080 0.015
(0.057) (0.037)
Interaction 0.130 0.136 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.036 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.049
(0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.084) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Group level employment -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.007** 0.007** 0.013**
(lagged) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Growth of group empl. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(lagged) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Group level employment -0.000*** -0.000*
(lagged, squared) 0.000 0.000
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Year effects N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
No of observations 5447 5447 5447 5447 5447 4987 4987 4987 4987 4987
Treated no of unique firms 119 119 119 119 119 117 117 117 117 117
Control no of unique firms 810 810 810 810 810 738 738 738 738 738
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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A Data appendix
BERD data is available at the ‘reporting unit’ level, which corresponds to
the geographical unit that has the postal address of the firm. The reporting
unit may or may not be larger than a ‘local unit’, therefore it may be larger
than a single plant or a single R&D lab. It may be attached to the head-
quarters or can be a separate unit. A slightly larger statistical unit than the
reporting unit is the ‘enterprise’, which is defined in the EU Regulation on Sta-
tistical Units (EEC 696/93) as “...an organizational unit producing goods or
services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making,
especially for the allocation of its current resources...”. BERD observations
have the reporting unit as their identifier and most of them also contain the
enterprise reference number.
An ‘enterprise group’ is defined as “an association of enterprises bound
together by legal and/or financial links. A group of enterprises can have more
than one decision-making centre [...]. It constitutes an economic entity which
is empowered to make choices, particularly concerning the units which it com-
prises (EEC 696/93)”. The definition of an enterprise group is important for
our purposes, as assignment to the treatment group depends on whether the
group as a whole satisfies the criteria for eligibility to the SME scheme. Re-
porting unit level R&D data in BERD is matched to the BSD at the enterprise
level. BERD provides information on both the reporting unit and enterprise
references for each observation.
The ONS constructs the BERD dataset using the responses to two types of
questionnaire forms sent out to firms: a long form and a short form. About 400
largest spenders (those who spent more than £3 million in a reference year)
on R&D receive a long form questionnaire, and the rest receive a short form
questionnaire. This latter form contains a small set of questions tracing basic
information, namely, the unit’s: (i) in-house R&D expenditure, (ii) extramu-
ral R&D expenditure, (iii) full time equivalent number of R&D personnel, and
(iv) total headcount on R&D. The long form collects a much wider set of vari-
ables, including a breakdown of R&D expenditure to product groups; capital
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and current expenditure, broken down into salaries and other current expen-
diture; sources of funding for R&D; a breakdown of the skills set for R&D
employment; and a breakdown of R&D expenditure into geographic locations
(UK postcodes). As smaller firms tend to spend less on R&D than larger firms,
the information available on SMEs is mostly limited to the questions asked in
the short form.
The group of smaller firms (as they are less likely to be among the top 400
spenders) are subject to sampling at different sampling fractions depending on
their size measured by employment. Since the stratified sampling procedure
is repeated every year, this causes gaps in the time series data. Based on the
publicly available BERD First Release data18, the breakdown of participants
to BERD Inquiry into long and short form recipients is around 4000 sampled
firms, out of which around 400 are sent a long form and the rest are sent a short
form. Out of the firms which receive short forms, all those with more than 400
employees are sampled. Within the size band of interest, there are firms with
250-400 employees, for which the sampling ratio is 1:3.19 The smallest firms,
that is, those with fewer than 100 employees are sampled with a 1:4 ratio.
When aggregating the data for the BERD publication, the ONS imputes
the values for the unsampled firms based on their employment number and
product group. In each of the 99 product group-size band ‘cells’ available (33
product groups over 3 size bands), the values for the unsampled observations
are imputed using the average R&D per worker value of those observations
which are not imputed, with employment as the scaling variable. For instance,
if an unsampled firm in sector H (Pharmaceuticals) and size band 2 (100-400
employees) has “x” employees (this information is available through the IDBR
for all firms), their unknown in-house R&D spending is imputed as the mean
R&D per worker in that cell multiplied by the employment number “x” of the
observation. This imputation procedure introduces a high level of variation
across years for a given reporting unit when the micro panel version of the
data set is used. The variance of the growth rate in R&D spending from
18Until 2007, this publication was part of the MA14 Business Monitor.
19Firms with 100-400 employees are sampled with this ratio.
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one year to the next increases significantly between two years of data when
these are imputed, and also when one of the two values is imputed. Figure
8 is taken from an earlier working paper on this topic (Guceri (2015)), and
demonstrates the uneven distribution of changes in R&D over time when the
observation moves from an actual value to an imputed value and vice versa.
The distribution of R&D growth rates is a smooth bell shaped curve only for
those observations which move from an actual value to another year’s actual
value.
Figure 8: Kernel density estimates for y-o-y real growth in R&D, size band
100-399
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